Energy commodities (second only to food and water) are the most critical resources for modern life and the smooth functioning of our societies. In fact, energy consumption is one of the most indicators that most reliably correlates with GDP growth. Yesterday, Spain and Portugal Grid went dark, and the economy was brought to a halt. Payment systems broke down, public transportation collapsed, comms were disrupted, and traffic in major cities became self-regulated. Citizens and businesses reverted to using FM radio, cash payments, and diesel-powered generators. Soâ what exactly happened?
The Grid is the longest functioning machine built by mankind. It is also the most complex, and the most expensive (at ~$5 Trillion replacement value in the US alone it dwarves the International Space Station and, frankly, anything else). The Grid is managed by the Grid Operator (often referred to as TSO), which essentially has two jobs.
Their first job is to balance Supply and Demand. Everyday, the market operator in Spain organizes an auction, asks consumers and utilities to forecast demand, fixes energy prices, and defines a production âprogramâ to meet the anticipated demand. This is called P48: 48 half-hourly periods that divide a full 24-hour day for energy scheduling and balancing purposes. If everyone followed their plan, the system would be balanced (and the TSO would be very happy and have less work). But this, never happens, and the real demand and generation almost always differs from the programmed plan. So, the Grid Operator needs to correct these balances by dialing up or down capacity or playing around with demand.
Their second job is to regulate Grid Frequency. Electricity isnât just about voltage (how strong the push is) but also how steadily and in in what rhythm that push happens. In Europe, systems are designed to keep frequency close to 50 Hz constantly. Keep this number in mind, it will comeback soon. Also, energy sources that rely on controllable inputs (gas, coal, hydro) are much better at regulating frequency than non-controllable ones (solar, wind).
To make things more complicated, the Energy Grid isnât a single, unified system. Itâs made up of many different nodes, each covering a region with its own electricity supply and demand. These nodes must stay in sync, which makes the Grid harder to manage. On top of that, some grids are interconnected across countries to share electricity. For example, Spainâs grid is interconnected to those of France, Portugal, Morocco and Andorra. This is good because it helps with stability but brings in new challenges (when things change in neighboring grids).
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Under normal circumstances, the Grid Operator has multiple tools at their disposal to balance the network: it does so by adding dispatchable capacity (e.g.: turning on a gas power plants, commonly referred to as âpeakerâ plants), shutting of large industrial consumers, and performing frequency regulation (e.g.: turbines in large gas, nuclear power plants, large scale generators).
Unbeknownst to most, the Grid Operator does this multiple times a day. All to ensure the smooth operation of the Grid. However, yesterdayâs misbalance, was more than the Grid Operator could handle.
At 12:33 pm, the frequency, dropped from the target 50 Hz to 49.85 Hz. This drop looks really small, but in the context of grid operation it is catastrophic. The Grid is designed to keep 50 Hz with an extremely tight margin of ±0.1 Hz. Anything outside this margin triggers an emergency shutdown.
This oscillation led to Spainâs grid disconnecting from the European system. Power Plants and relays at the different nodes started disconnecting to protect themselves, and this cascaded into a widespread collapse of the system. In under 5 seconds, Spain lost 15GW of capacity (equivalent to 60% of the overall demand). Portugal and Spainâs mainland went dark. Â All the 7 nuclear power plants shut down. Some analysts even claim that if the drop had been closer to 0.2 Hz we would be talking about a continent-scale blackout.
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The challenge with Spain is that itâs a Grid with extremely high solar and wind penetration. In this specific case, this is bad because most renewable capacity, (unlike, for instance, gas) cannot be dispatched on-demand. There is, literally, no precedent in history of such a large Grid, with such penetration of renewables, being reenergized. We will soon become a case study. The response and root causes will surely be studied by TSOs around the world.
It took 17 hours for the system to restore 90%+ of the Grid (at 5 am today), way more than the planned 6-8 hours. The reason for such a slow restart is that the Grid Operator needs to do this node by node, doing so little by little to avoid the very same frequency imbalances that would bring us back to square one. Also, as crazy as it sounds⊠many power plants (here and elsewhere) require external electricity to restart from this state (called a black start), they cannot restart on their own.
To make things worse, the longer it takes to restart everything, the worse. It is a compounding problem. Substations at the different nodes are equipped with batteries that allow for remote restart of switches. After 10+ hours, there is risk of depleting this batteries, and reenergizing nodes could have required some manual switching (watch this, the safety and PPE involved, it will probably blow your mind).
We also were lucky we had help from our neighbors with energy is flowing from France and Morocco to help wake up the Grid. Also, water reservoirs were at record levels, and Hydro which is fast, great at frequency regulation and voltage stabilization, has been fundamental to restore the grid overnight. Gas Combined Cycles did most of the heavy lifting too, and saved the Grid - despite coming out of a wild winder that pushed them through extremely demanding operating regimes.
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Letâs preface this by saying, "Nobody Knows Anything" (yet). But multiple hypotheses have floated as plausible explanations for this incident. Letâs review them, in no particular order:
It is still early to say, but if we had to bet our money we are inclined to think this was not a product of a cyberattack, and is more likely to be technically related, likely any of the options 2 to 5.
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We are certain this will send shockwaves through both Spain and Europe. As we said before, this will likely be a textbook example on multiple topics like Grid Design, âBlack Startâ (re-powering a Grid after shutdown) and Energy Policy. In summary we believe we will this episode will ignite all of the following:
Altogether, we believe this is a great opportunity for startups like ours (evoltio.es) and for Founders building in the sector. Energy is back at the top of the agenda.
Letâs build đȘ!
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